On 9/11/2001 there were no fighter aircraft close enough to NYC or Washington DC to provide a deterrent. All of the bases close to large “target” cities were shut down and their defense was left to the few remaining Air National Guard units.

By promoting among fighter pilots, the air coordinator for the first Gulf War was unaware of the need for AC-130 gunships to exit combat areas before dawn, and “on January 31, 1991, the enemy shot down one AC-130H gunship (call-sign SPIRIT-03). It resulted in the loss of all 14 crewmembers, the largest single air power loss of the war”, because the aircraft remained in the combat zone after there was enough light to spot the large, low-flying, slow-moving aircraft.

The Strategic Air Command was in charge of nuclear weapons, both bombs and missiles, and had rigid rules in place for dealing with and accounting for them. It is nearly impossible to accept that SAC would have allowed 5 nuclear warheads to be unaccounted for as they were moved in error between two bases. Those things didn’t happen in SAC. The command was a PITA, but they didn’t lose nukes.

Yes, the Air Force needed to go on a “diet” after the end of the Cold War, but the function of the Air Force Chief of Staff is to advise the Secretary of Defense on Air Force issues, not blindly follow orders that reduce the effectiveness of the Air Force and the security of the United States.

Because of the changes started by McPeak, the Air Force is stuck with aging airframes that, in the case of the F-15s, occasionally fracture from fatigue. The current AC-130s need to be replaced, but there are none in the pipe line. The F-22 and F-35 that are supposed to replace the F-15 and F-16 are late, way over budget, and in many ways not as capable as the aircraft they are replacing. The B-1B and B-2 that were supposed to replace the aging B-52 fleet can’t hack it, so the B-52 is still flying. The KC-135 tanker fleet is coming apart from old age and the replacement is only now being ordered.

All of these things can be traced back to the reign of McPeak and the decisions he made as Air Force Chief of Staff. Those who came after him are as culpable, because they did nothing to stop the erosion. The current leaders of the Air Force can’t think strategically, so they make tactical decisions that further degrade the service.

My Dad retired from the Air Force and I was in from 1966 to 1974. In all those years two things were never discussed on duty – politics and religion. Unfortunately that can’t be said of today’s service.

Maybe these were unwise things to do — I have no idea, and look forward to learning — but that’s not really established here except by association with Cheney. A given military branch like the SAC (at least arguably a relic of the 50s, before ICBMs and SLBMs — though recallable, unlike those) will resent being downsized, their gripes should be taken with a shaker full of salt, it seems to me.

The outfit change does sound dumb, though, you’d thing people at that level would have more important things on their mind. But practically all generals are ‘political’ re the kind of stuff you describe — they implement policy given to them by civilians. That’s what they’re supposed to do, within reason. None of this stuff — fighter supremacy, downsizing SAC — sounds, on the face of it, to be beyond reason.

I was down here among the retired and retiring when he was playing his games with the Air Force and if you want nasty, there’s nothing like retired generals talking about one of their own, especially the bomber drivers who watched him eliminate SAC. He was not a beloved leader and those quoted titles are some of the milder things they called him.

He was a political general, so this isn’t unusual behavior for him. I wouldn’t turn my back on him.

[tried to respond to you over yonder but the intertubes are pretty sticky tonight on the dial-up side…]